David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2004)
Isaac Levi's new book develops further his pioneering work in formal epistemology, focusing on the problem of belief contraction, or how rationally to relinquish old beliefs. Levi offers the most penetrating analysis to date of this key question in epistemology, offering a completely new solution and explaining its relation to his earlier proposals. He mounts an argument in favor of the thesis that contracting a state of belief by giving up specific beliefs is to be evaluated in terms of the value of the information lost by doing so. The rationale aims to be thoroughly decision theoretic. Levi spells out his goals and shows that certain types of recommendations are obtained if one seeks to promote these goals. He compares his approach to his earlier account of inductive expansion. The recommendations are for "mild contractions." These are formally the same as the "severe withdrawals" considered by Pagnucco and Rott. The rationale, however, is different. A critical part of the book concerns the elaboration of these differences. The results are relevant to accounts of the conditions under which it is legitimate to cease believing and to accounts of conditionals. Mild Contraction will be of great interest to all specialists in belief revision theory and to many students of formal epistemology, philosophy of science, and pragmatism.
|Keywords||Belief and doubt Knowledge, Theory of Decision making|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$35.42 used (68% off) $85.00 new (23% off) $110.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BD215.L46 2004|
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Citations of this work BETA
John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre (2016). Belief is Weak. Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.
Gregory Wheeler & Marco Alberti (2011). NO Revision and NO Contraction. Minds and Machines 21 (3):411-430.
John Cantwell (2008). Indicative Conditionals:Factual or Epistemic? Studia Logica 88 (1):157 - 194.
Hans Rott (2009). Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer 301--339.
Emmanuel J. Genot (2009). The Game of Inquiry: The Interrogative Approach to Inquiry and Belief Revision Theory. Synthese 171 (2):271-289.
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StephenMurray Glaister (2000). Recovery Recovered. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2):171-206.
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Isaac Levi (1991). The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through Inquiry. Cambridge University Press.
André Fuhrmann (2006). Mild Contraction: Evaluating Loss of Informational Value Due to Loss of Belief. Journal of Philosophy 103 (11):587-591.
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