David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):248-272 (2015)
In this paper I argue against Brandom's two-ply theory of action. For Brandom, action is the result of an agent acknowledging a practical commitment and then causally responding to that commitment by acting. Action is social because the content of the commitment upon which one acts is socially conferred in the game of giving and asking for reasons. On my proposal, instead of seeing action as the coupling of a rational capacity to acknowledge commitments and a non-rational capacity to reliably respond to these commitments, we should see action as the coupling, or potential coupling, of a capacity to reason practically and a capacity to act on habits and bodily skills. In putting forward this alternative model of action, I aim to replace Brandom's rationalist brand of Pragmatism with a more classical kind, one that will let us see action as social not only at the level of reasons but also at the level of bodily habits and skills
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Brandom (2000). Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Harvard University Press.
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Wilfrid Sellars (1963). Science, Perception, and Reality. New York, Humanities Press.
Pierre Bourdieu (1992). The Logic of Practice. Inquiry 35:447.
Charles Taylor (1995). Philosophical Arguments. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Simon Lumsden (2015). Second Nature and Historical Change in Hegel’s Philosophy of History. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (1):74-94.
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