David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):205-229 (2003)
Both libertarian and compatibilist approaches have been unsuccessful in providing an acceptable account of free will. Recent developments in cognitive neuroscience, including the connectionist theory of mind and empirical findings regarding modularity and integration of brain functions, provide the basis for a new approach: neural holism. This approach locates free will in fully integrated behavior in which all of a person's beliefs and desires, implicitly represented in the brain, automatically contribute to an act. Deliberation, the experience of volition, and cognitive and behavioral shortcomings are easily understood under this model. Assigning moral praise and blame, often seen as grounded in the notion that a person has the ability to have done otherwise, will be shown to reflect instead important aspects of signaling in social interactions. Thus, important aspects of the traditional notion of free will can be accounted for within the proposed model, which has interesting implications for lifelong cognitive development.
|Keywords||Free Will Holism Neural Philosophy Psychology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1988). Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture. Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Citations of this work BETA
Gerben Meynen (2010). Free Will and Mental Disorder: Exploring the Relationship. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (6):429-443.
Similar books and articles
Carissa Véliz (2011). Which Came First, the Chicken or the Egg? Rethinking Causal Directions Between Neural Mechanisms, Agency, and Human Enhancement. American Journal of Bioethics 2 (3):46-48.
Robert B. Glassman (1983). Free Will has a Neural Substrate: Critique of Joseph F. Rychlak's Discovering Free Will and Personal Responsibility. Zygon 18 (1):67-82.
Geraint Rees & John Haynes (2004). Peer Commentary on Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Causal or Representational Holism? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):42-45.
Nancey C. Murphy (2007). Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?: Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Robert H. Kane (1999). New Directions on Free Will. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr 135-142.
Tim Bayne (2011). Libet and the Case for Free Will Scepticism. In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. OUP/British Academy
Joe Morrison (2010). Just How Controversial is Evidential Holism? Synthese 173 (3):335-352.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads52 ( #81,991 of 1,907,383 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #275,486 of 1,907,383 )
How can I increase my downloads?