On theory-change and meaning-change

Philosophy of Science 46 (3):407-424 (1979)
I argue against the currently popular view that a radical change in theory affects the meaning of theoretical terms, and hence render pre- and post-shift theories incomparable. I first show how to pose the meaning-change issue without appeal to meanings reified. I contend that arguments against theory-neutral observation languages are faulty, but that even if they were sound, there are semantic devices that allow a theory to refer to the factual basis of a competitor. This suggests a picture of science as the accumulation of truths, with each successive stage being more stable
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    Harold I. Brown (2005). Incommensurability Reconsidered. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (1):149-169.
    Jarrett Leplin (1981). Truth and Scientific Progress. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 12 (4):269-291.
    Harold I. Brown (1990). Prospective Realism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (2):211-242.
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