David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2001)
Conscious experience presents a deep puzzle. On the one hand, a fairly robust materialism must be true in order to explain how it is that conscious events causally interact with non-conscious, physical events. On the other hand, we cannot explain how physical phenomena give rise to conscious experience. In this wide-ranging study, Joseph Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly influential ideas on the "explanatory gap," the fact that we can't explain the nature of phenomenal experience in terms of its physical realization. He presents a careful argument that there is such a gap, and, after providing intriguing analyses of virtually all existing theories of consciousness, shows that recent attempts to close it fall short of the mark. Levine concludes that in the foreseeable future consciousness will remain a mystery
|Keywords||Cognition Consciousness Explanation Metaphysics Mind Qualia|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$3.90 used (91% off) $19.97 new (53% off) $35.32 direct from Amazon (16% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD418.3.L48 2001|
|ISBN(s)||0195132351 0195173082 9780195132359|
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Citations of this work BETA
Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2005). Concepts, Introspection, and Phenomenal Consciousness: An Information-Theoretical Approach. Noûs 39 (2):197-255.
Ned Block (2007). Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
Pär Sundström (2011). Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.
Mark B. Couch (2011). Mechanisms and Constitutive Relevance. Synthese 183 (3):375-388.
Pär Sundström (2007). Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.
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