David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 12 (1-4):371 – 393 (1969)
This paper purports a limited study of the concept of reason. It analyzes the claim of religious belief to be reasonable. The context for this analysis is an examination of some evidential (criteriological) connections between reasonable belief and ?(good) reasons? for such belief. Consideration of the typical sort of evidential connection shows, not surprisingly, that religious belief cannot claim to be reasonable. But it is argued that there is (at least) one other sort of connection, and that it is philosophically plausible to regard this connection as definitive of a quite distinctive sense of ?reasonable?, with its own kind and style of criteria, according to which religious belief can be thought reasonable
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References found in this work BETA
Nelson Goodman (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press.
Nelson Goodman (1960). The Way the World Is. Review of Metaphysics 14 (1):48 - 56.
Thomas S. Kuhn (1996/2012). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press.
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