Richard McCormick and Proportionate Reason

Journal of Religious Ethics 13 (2):258 - 278 (1985)
Abstract
In response to criticisms of his "Ambiguity in Moral Choice", Richard McCormick developed, in "Commentary on the Commentaries," an alternative view on proportionate reason. I interpret McCormick's view in terms of what I call "the undermining principle," "the theory of associated goods," "the necessity principle," and "the liberty principle." I argue that the first two are the heart of the theory and link McCormick's view to that of Peter Knauer. I then show that McCormick's view suffers from several problems, including a lack of argumentation for his central undermining principle, and counterexamples to his necessity and liberty principles.
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