David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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American Journal of Bioethics 7 (9):3-11 (2007)
The extended mind thesis is the claim that mental states extend beyond the skulls of the agents whose states they are. This seemingly obscure and bizarre claim has far-reaching implications for neuroethics, I argue. In the first half of this article, I sketch the extended mind thesis and defend it against criticisms. In the second half, I turn to its neuroethical implications. I argue that the extended mind thesis entails the falsity of the claim that interventions into the brain are especially problematic just because they are internal interventions, but that many objections to such interventions rely, at least in part, on this claim. Further, I argue that the thesis alters the focus of neuroethics, away from the question of whether we ought to allow interventions into the mind, and toward the question of which interventions we ought to allow and under what conditions. The extended mind thesis dramatically expands the scope of neuroethics: because interventions into the environment of agents can count as interventions into their minds, decisions concerning such interventions become questions for neuroethics
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
Richard Heersmink (forthcoming). Extended Mind and Cognitive Enhancement: Moral Aspects of Cognitive Artifacts. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.
Sven Walter (2010). Locked-in Syndrome, Bci, and a Confusion About Embodied, Embedded, Extended, and Enacted Cognition. Neuroethics 3 (1):61-72.
Thomas Douglas (2014). Criminal Rehabilitation Through Medical Intervention: Moral Liability and the Right to Bodily Integrity. Journal of Ethics 18 (2):101-122.
Mason Cash (2010). Extended Cognition, Personal Responsibility, and Relational Autonomy. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):645-671.
Neil Levy (2014). Is Neurolaw Conceptually Confused? Journal of Ethics 18 (2):171-185.
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