American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):379-404 (1997)
|Abstract||This paper surveys current theories on the nature of conscious experience, from traditional central state identity theories and functionalism, to more recent higher-order and representationalist theories. It is concluded that no current theory really solves the fundamental problem of how to incorporate conscious experience into the physical world, though much progress has been made|
|Keywords||Consciousness Materialism Metaphysics Mind Subjectivity|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Peter Carruthers (2004). Suffering Without Subjectivity. Philosophical Studies 121 (2):99-125.
Kathleen Wider (1997). The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Todd C. Moody (1986). Distinguishing Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (December):289-95.
David Papineau (2002). Thinking About Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Ben L. Mijuskovic (1976). The Simplicity Argument Versus a Materialist Theory of Consciousness. Philosophy Today 20:292-305.
Charles Taliaferro (1997). The Perils of Subjectivity. Inquiry 40 (4):475-480.
Ted Honderich (2001). Mind the Guff. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (4):62-78.
Uriah Kriegel (2004). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. The Monist 87 (2):182-205.
Pete Mandik (2009). The Neurophilosophy of Subjectivity. In John Bickle (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads12 ( #101,057 of 722,681 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,006 of 722,681 )
How can I increase my downloads?