David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133 (2009)
In this article we survey six recent developments in the philosophical literature on free will and moral responsibility: (1) Harry Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise; (2) the heightened focus upon the source of free actions; (3) the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept; (4) recent compatibilist attempts to resurrect the thesis that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise; (5) the role of the control condition in free will and moral responsibility, and finally (6) the debate centering on luck.
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References found in this work BETA
Nomy Arpaly (2006). Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will. Princeton University Press.
Nomy Arpaly (2003). Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency. Oxford University Press.
Bernard Berofsky (2003). Classical Compatibilism: Not Dead Yet. In Michael McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. 107.
Bernard Berofsky (2002). Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Sarah Buss & Lee Overton (eds.) (2002). Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. MIT Press, Bradford Books.
Citations of this work BETA
Neil Levy (2012). Skepticism and Sanction: The Benefits of Rejecting Moral Responsibility. Law and Philosophy 31 (5):477-493.
D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (2012). The Nature and Ethics of Blame. Philosophy Compass 7 (3):197-207.
Peter Schulte (2014). Beyond Verbal Disputes: The Compatibilism Debate Revisited. Erkenntnis 79 (3):669-685.
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