Recent work on free will and moral responsibility
Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133 (2009)
| Abstract | In this article we survey six recent developments in the philosophical literature on free will and moral responsibility: (1) Harry Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise; (2) the heightened focus upon the source of free actions; (3) the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept; (4) recent compatibilist attempts to resurrect the thesis that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise; (5) the role of the control condition in free will and moral responsibility, and finally (6) the debate centering on luck. | |||||||||
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Michael S. McKenna (1998). Moral Theory and Modified Compatibilism. Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (January):441-458.
P. S. Greenspan (1999). Impulse and Self-Reflection: Frankfurtian Responsibility Versus Free Will. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):325-341.
Paul Russell (1995). Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
John S. Callender (2010). Free Will and Responsibility. A Guide for Practitioners. Oxford University Press.
John Martin Fischer (2004). Free Will and Moral Responsibility. In D. Copps (ed.), Handbook on Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press.
Manuel Vargas (2009). Taking the Highway on Skepticism, Luck, and the Value of Responsibility. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2):249-265.
Manuel Vargas (2009). Taking the Highway on Skepticism, Luck, and the Value of Responsibility. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2):249-265.
Elinor Mason (2005). Recent Work: Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Books 46 (4):343-353.
Elinor Mason (2005). Recent Work on Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Books 46 (4):343-353.
Neil Levy (2011). Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
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