David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133 (2009)
In this article we survey six recent developments in the philosophical literature on free will and moral responsibility: (1) Harry Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise; (2) the heightened focus upon the source of free actions; (3) the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept; (4) recent compatibilist attempts to resurrect the thesis that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise; (5) the role of the control condition in free will and moral responsibility, and finally (6) the debate centering on luck.
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
John M. Doris (2002). Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. Cambridge University Press.
Derk Pereboom (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge University Press.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Citations of this work BETA
Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2012). What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):563-593.
Ezio Di Nucci (2014). Avoiding and Alternate Possibilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):1001-1007.
Frej Klem Thomsen (2014). There but for the Grace of My Orbitofrontal Cortex …. [REVIEW] Criminal Justice Ethics 33 (3):220-235.
D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (2012). The Nature and Ethics of Blame. Philosophy Compass 7 (3):197-207.
Neil Levy (2012). Skepticism and Sanction: The Benefits of Rejecting Moral Responsibility. Law and Philosophy 31 (5):477-493.
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Manuel Vargas (2009). Taking the Highway on Skepticism, Luck, and the Value of Responsibility. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2):249-265.
Manuel Vargas (2009). Taking the Highway on Skepticism, Luck, and the Value of Responsibility. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2):249-265.
John Martin Fischer (2004). Free Will and Moral Responsibility. In D. Copps (ed.), Handbook on Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press
John S. Callender (2010). Free Will and Responsibility. A Guide for Practitioners. Oxford University Press.
Paul Russell (1995). Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
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Neil Levy (2011). Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
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