David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):134 - 155 (2011)
I develop an account of weakness of the will that is driven by experimental evidence from cognitive and social psychology. I will argue that this account demonstrates that there is no such thing as weakness of the will: no psychological kind corresponds to it. Instead, weakness of the will ought to be understood as depletion of System II resources. Neither the explanatory purposes of psychology nor our practical purposes as agents are well-served by retaining the concept. I therefore suggest that we ought to jettison it, in favour of the vocabulary and concepts of cognitive psychology.
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References found in this work BETA
George Ainslie (2001). Breakdown of Will. Cambridge University Press.
Donald Davidson (1970). How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts. Oxford University Press
Dylan Dodd (2009). Weakness of Will as Intention-Violation. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):45-59.
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Citations of this work BETA
Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2014). How is Willpower Possible? The Puzzle of Synchronic Self‐Control and the Divided Mind. Noûs 48 (1):41-74.
Joshua May & Richard Holton (2012). What in the World is Weakness of Will? Philosophical Studies 157 (3):341–360.
Neil Levy (2012). Ecological Engineering: Reshaping Our Environments to Achieve Our Goals. Philosophy and Technology 25 (4):589-604.
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Gwynneth Matthews (1966). Weakness of Will. Mind 75 (299):405-419.
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Tobias Hoffmann (2008). Henry of Ghent's Voluntarist Account of Weakness of Will. In Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present. Catholic University of America Press
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