Resisting 'Weakness of the Will'

I develop an account of weakness of the will that is driven by experimental evidence from cognitive and social psychology. I will argue that this account demonstrates that there is no such thing as weakness of the will: no psychological kind corresponds to it. Instead, weakness of the will ought to be understood as depletion of System II resources. Neither the explanatory purposes of psychology nor our practical purposes as agents are well-served by retaining the concept. I therefore suggest that we ought to jettison it, in favour of the vocabulary and concepts of cognitive psychology.
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DOI 10.2307/41057516
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References found in this work BETA
George Ainslie (2001). Breakdown of Will. Cambridge University Press.
Donald Davidson (1970). How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts. Oxford University Press

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Citations of this work BETA
Neil Levy (2014). Addiction as a Disorder of Belief. Biology and Philosophy 29 (3):337-355.

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