Self-deception without thought experiments
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In T. Bayne & J. Fernández (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation. Psychology Press (2008)
Theories of self-deception divide into those that hold that the state is characterized by some kind of synchronic tension or conflict between propositional attitudes and those that deny this. Proponents of the latter like Al Mele claim that their theories are more parsimonious, because they do not require us to postulate any psychological mechanisms beyond those which have been independently verified. But if we can show that there are real cases of motivated believing which are characterized by conflicting propositional attitudes, however, the parsimony argument against incongruent mental state accounts is undermined. I argue that anosognosia presents us with a real-life example of motivated belief together with (sub)-doxastic conflict
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Lisa Bortolotti (2015). The Epistemic Innocence of Motivated Delusions. Consciousness and Cognition (33):490-499.
Lisa Bortolotti & Rochelle Cox (2009). Faultless Ignorance: Strengths and Limitations of Epistemic Definitions of Confabulation. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):952-965.
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