David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (1997)
Isaac Levi is one of the preeminent philosophers in the areas of pragmatic rationality and epistemology. This collection of essays constitutes an important presentation of his original and influential ideas about rational choice and belief. A wide range of topics is covered, including consequentialism and sequential choice, consensus, voluntarism of belief, and the tolerance of the opinions of others. The essays elaborate on the idea that principles of rationality are norms that regulate the coherence of our beliefs and values with our rational choices. The norms impose minimal constraints on deliberation and inquiry, but they also impose demands well beyond the capacities of deliberating agents. This major collection will be eagerly sought out by a wide range of philosophers in epistemology, logic, and philosophy of science, as well as economists, decision theorists, and statisticians.
|Keywords||Reasoning Reason Norm (Philosophy Rational choice theory Belief and doubt|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$4.36 used (94% off) $46.95 new (33% off) $55.65 direct from Amazon (21% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BC177.L48 1997|
|ISBN(s)||0521576016 0521572886 9780521576017|
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Citations of this work BETA
Derek Baker (2015). Deliberators Must Be Imperfect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3).
Christopher J. G. Meacham & Jonathan Weisberg (2011). Representation Theorems and the Foundations of Decision Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):641 - 663.
Niels Skovgaard-Olsen (forthcoming). The Problem of Logical Omniscience, the Preface Paradox, and Doxastic Commitments. Synthese:1-23.
Lina Eriksson & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2013). The Interference Problem for the Betting Interpretation of Degrees of Belief. Synthese 190 (5):809-830.
Eleonora Cresto (2012). A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):923-955.
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