The evidential status of philosophical intuition

Philosophical Studies 121 (3):193-224 (2004)
Abstract
  Philosophers have traditionally held that claims about necessities and possibilities are to be evaluated by consulting our philosophical intuitions; that is, those peculiarly compelling deliverances about possibilities that arise from a serious and reflective attempt to conceive of counterexamples to these claims. But many contemporary philosophers, particularly naturalists, argue that intuitions of this sort are unreliable, citing examples of once-intuitive, but now abandoned, philosophical theses, as well as recent psychological studies that seem to establish the general fallibility of intuition.In the first two sections of this paper, I evaluate these arguments, and also the counter-arguments of contemporary defenders of tradition. In the next two sections, I sketch an alternative account of the role of philosophical intuitions that incorporates elements of traditionalism and naturalism - and defend it against other such views. In the final section, however, I discuss intuitions about conscious experience, and acknowledge that my view may not extend comfortably to this case. This may seem unfortunate, since so much contemporary discussion of the epistemology of modality seems motivated by worries about the mind-body problem, and informed by the position one wishes to endorse. But, as I argue, if conscious experience is indeed an exception to the view I suggest in this paper, it is an exception that proves - and can illuminate - the rule
Keywords A Priori  Epistemology  Evidence  Experience  Intuition  Modality
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    References found in this work BETA
    George Bealer (2000). A Theory of the a Priori. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):1–30.
    George Bealer (1994). Mental Properties. Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):185-208.
    George Bealer (1999). The a Priori. In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell. 2004.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Jennifer Nado (2013). Why Intuition? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):n/a-n/a.
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