The evidential status of philosophical intuition
Philosophical Studies 121 (3):193-224 (2004)
| Abstract | Philosophers have traditionally held that claims about necessities and possibilities are to be evaluated by consulting our philosophical intuitions; that is, those peculiarly compelling deliverances about possibilities that arise from a serious and reflective attempt to conceive of counterexamples to these claims. But many contemporary philosophers, particularly naturalists, argue that intuitions of this sort are unreliable, citing examples of once-intuitive, but now abandoned, philosophical theses, as well as recent psychological studies that seem to establish the general fallibility of intuition.In the first two sections of this paper, I evaluate these arguments, and also the counter-arguments of contemporary defenders of tradition. In the next two sections, I sketch an alternative account of the role of philosophical intuitions that incorporates elements of traditionalism and naturalism - and defend it against other such views. In the final section, however, I discuss intuitions about conscious experience, and acknowledge that my view may not extend comfortably to this case. This may seem unfortunate, since so much contemporary discussion of the epistemology of modality seems motivated by worries about the mind-body problem, and informed by the position one wishes to endorse. But, as I argue, if conscious experience is indeed an exception to the view I suggest in this paper, it is an exception that proves - and can illuminate - the rule | |||||||||
| Keywords | A Priori Epistemology Evidence Experience Intuition Modality | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,882 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesYuri Cath (2012). Evidence and Intuition. Episteme 9 (4):311-328.
Mark Fedyk (2009). Philosophical Intuitions. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2:54-80.
Ernest Sosa (1996). Rational Intuition: Bealer on its Nature and Epistemic Status. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):151--162.
Alison Gopnik & Eric Schwitzgebel (1998). Whose Concepts Are They, Anyway? The Role of Philosophical Intuition in Empirical Psychology. In M. R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
George Bealer (1996). A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):121-142.
Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux (2009). Intuitions Are Inclinations to Believe. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):89 - 109.
Joel Pust (2000). Intuitions as Evidence. Routledge.
Janet Levin (2007). Can Modal Intuitions Be Evidence for Essentialist Claims? Inquiry 50 (3):253 – 269.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads134 ( #3,429 of 556,916 )Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #16,193 of 556,916 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
