David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Cambridge University Press (1991)
Isaac Levi's new book is concerned with how one can justify changing one's beliefs. The discussion is deeply informed by the belief-doubt model advocated by C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, of which the book provides a substantial analysis. Professor Levi then addresses the conceptual framework of potential changes available to an inquirer. A structural approach to propositional attitudes is proposed which rejects the conventional view that a propositional attitude involves a relation between an agent and either a linguistic entity or some other intentional object such as a proposition or set of possible worlds. The last two chapters offer an account of change in states of full belief understood as changes in commitments rather than changes in performance; one chapter deals with adding new information to a belief state, the other with giving up information. The book builds upon topics discussed in some of Levi's earlier work. It will be of particular interest to discussion theorists, epistemologists, philosophers of science, computer scientists, and cognitive psychologists.
|Keywords||Belief and doubt Probabilities Epistemics Knowledge, Theory of|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$16.16 used (85% off) $37.53 new (19% off) $45.99 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BD215.L45 1991|
|ISBN(s)||9780521412667 0521412668 0521110297|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Gerhard Schurz (2011). Verisimilitude and Belief Revision. With a Focus on the Relevant Element Account. Erkenntnis 75 (2):203-221.
André Fuhrmann & Sven Ove Hansson (1994). A Survey of Multiple Contractions. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (1):39-75.
Erik J. Olsson (2005). The Impossibility of Coherence. Erkenntnis 63 (3):387 - 412.
Niels Skovgaard-Olsen (forthcoming). The Problem of Logical Omniscience, the Preface Paradox, and Doxastic Commitments. Synthese:1-23.
John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre (2016). Belief is Weak. Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.
Similar books and articles
Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giacomo Bonanno (1997). The Logic of Belief Persistence. Economics and Philosophy 13 (1):39-59.
Hamid Vahid (2009). The Epistemology of Belief. Palgrave Macmillan.
Greg Restall (1997). Ways Things Can't Be. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):583-596.
Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.) (2011). Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
Isaac Levi (1997). The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of Thought. Cambridge University Press.
Sven Ove Hansson (1993). Reversing the Levi Identity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (6):637 - 669.
Donald J. Cunningham, James B. Schreiber & Connie M. Moss (2005). Belief, Doubt and Reason: C. S. Peirce on Education. Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (2):177–189.
Giacomo Bonanno (2008). Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework. In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press
Isaac Levi (2004). Mild Contraction: Evaluating Loss of Information Due to Loss of Belief. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #158,618 of 1,940,944 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #457,798 of 1,940,944 )
How can I increase my downloads?