David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):221-229 (2013)
A number of philosophers have recently argued that agents need not be conscious of the reasons for which they act or the moral significance of their actions in order to be morally responsible for them. In this paper, I identify a kind of awareness that, I claim, agents must have in order to be responsible for their actions. I argue that conscious information processing differs from unconscious in a manner that makes the following two claims true: (1) an agent’s values ought to be identified with attitudes of which she is conscious, because having a value entails having a set of dispositions produced by conscious attitudes alone, and (2) that only actions settled upon by conscious deliberation are deeply attributable to agents, because only such actions express the agent’s evaluative stance
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (2008). Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Nomy Arpaly (2003). Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Conor McHugh (2013). Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic Agency. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.
Constantine Sandis (2015). Verbal Reports and ‘Real’ Reasons: Confabulation and Conflation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):267-280.
Similar books and articles
Neil Levy (2012). A Role for Consciousness After All. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):255-264.
Nancy E. Snow (2006). Habitual Virtuous Actions and Automaticity. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):545 - 561.
David Rosenthal (2012). Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function. Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594):1424-1438.
Ishtiyaque Haji (1996). Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Induced Pro-Attitudes. Dialogue 35 (04):703-.
Neil Levy (2008). Restoring Control: Comments on George Sher. [REVIEW] Philosophia 36 (2):213-221.
Storrs McCall (2013). Does the Brain Lead the Mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):262-265.
A. Field (2000). I Like It, but I'm Not Sure Why: Can Evaluative Conditioning Occur Without Conscious Awareness? Consciousness and Cognition 9 (1):13-36.
Christopher Peacocke (2006). Mental Action and Self-Awareness. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
A. Wohlschlager, K. Engbert & P. Haggard (2003). Intentionality as a Constituting Condition for the Own Self-and Other Selves. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):708-716.
Uriah Kriegel (2003). Consciousness as Sensory Quality and as Implicit Self-Awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26.
Andreas Wohlschläger, Kai Engbert & Patrick Haggard (2003). Intentionality as a Constituting Condition for the Own Self--And Other Selves. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):708-716.
Andrew Eshleman (1997). Alternative Possibilities and the Free Will Defence. Religious Studies 33 (3):267-286.
Pierre Bonzon (2003). Conscious Behavior Through Reflexive Dialogs. In A. Günter, R. Kruse & B. Neumann (eds.), Lectures Notes in Artificial Intelligence. Springer
Added to index2012-04-23
Total downloads111 ( #20,675 of 1,724,879 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #59,658 of 1,724,879 )
How can I increase my downloads?