The Limits of Critical Thinking

Informal Logic 14 (2) (1992)
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Abstract

This paper examines Robert Fogelin's suggestion that there may be deep disagreements, where no argument can address what is at issue. A number of possible bases for Fogelin's position are considered and rejected: people sometimes do not have enough in common for reasons to count as reasons; doubt is possible only against the background of framework propositions; key premises may be inarguable; argument must occur within a conceptual framework. The paper concludes by reflecting on why it is important to have a point of view when thinking critically about an argument and whether that fact constitutes a limitation as to what can be achieved by critical thinking

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Don Levi
University of Oregon

References found in this work

A defense of abortion.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1971 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.
The logic of deep disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1):3-11.
Understanding the abortion argument.Roger Wertheimer - 1971 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):67-95.

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