David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 105 (2):107-127 (2001)
There are two reasons to think that determinism is incompatible with responsibility. The first is that determinism negates the ability to do otherwise. The second is that determinism negates "ultimate self-causation" – that is, an agent’s being the ultimately self-caused originator of her action. My article responds to the second reason. I argue that ultimate self-causation is metaphysically impossible. Therefore if "source incompatibilists" like Robert Kane are right that responsibility requires ultimate self-causation, then responsibility is metaphysically impossible.
|Keywords||determinism indeterminism free will Libertarianism ultimate self-causation Robert Kane source incompatibilism responsibility|
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