The Main Problem with USC Libertarianism

Philosophical Studies 105 (2):107-127 (2001)
There are two reasons to think that determinism is incompatible with responsibility. The first is that determinism negates the ability to do otherwise. The second is that determinism negates "ultimate self-causation" – that is, an agent’s being the ultimately self-caused originator of her action. My article responds to the second reason. I argue that ultimate self-causation is metaphysically impossible. Therefore if "source incompatibilists" like Robert Kane are right that responsibility requires ultimate self-causation, then responsibility is metaphysically impossible.
Keywords determinism  indeterminism  free will  Libertarianism  ultimate self-causation  Robert Kane  source incompatibilism  responsibility
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DOI 10.1023/A:1010359730833
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