The modal status of materialism
Philosophical Studies 145 (3):351 - 362 (2009)
| Abstract | Materialism, as traditionally conceived, has a contingent side and a necessary side. The necessity of materialism is reflected by the metaphysics of realization, while its contingency is a matter of accepting the possibility of Cartesian worlds, worlds in which our minds are roughly as Descartes describes them. In this paper we argue that the necessity and the contingency of materialism are in conflict. In particular, we claim that if mental properties are realized by physical properties in the actual world, Cartesian worlds are impossible. | |||||||||
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Jonathan Opie (1999). A Defense of Cartesian Materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):939 - 963.
Lynne Baker (2011). Christian Materialism in a Scientific Age. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):47-59.
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Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). A Defense of Cartesian Materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):939-63.
Joseph Levine (1983). Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
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