David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 66 (4):509-533 (1999)
Leeds (1990) levels an objection against the criterion of rational choice I have proposed (Levi 1997, Ch. 6; 1980; 1986), pointing out that the criterion is sensitive to the way possible consequences are partitioned. Seidenfeld, Kadane and Schervish (1989) call into question the defense of the cross product rule by appeal to Pareto Unanimity Principles that I had invoked in my 1986. I offer clarifications of my proposals showing that the difference between my views and those of my critics concerns the extent to which full belief, probabilistic belief, and value judgment are separable
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