David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Frankfurt-style cases are widely taken to show that agents do not need alternative possibilities to be morally responsible for their actions. Many philosophers take these cases to constitute a powerful argument for compatibilism: if we do not need alternative possibilities for moral responsibility, it is hard to see what the attraction of indeterminism might be. I defend the claim that even though Frankfurt-style cases establish that agents can be responsible for their actions despite lacking alternatives, agents can only be responsible if they possess certain powers, and possession of these powers is - arguably - incompatible with determinism. Because this is the case, Frankfurt-style cases fail to advance the debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ishtiyaque Haji (1999). Indeterminism and Frankfurt-Type Examples. Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58.
Richard M. Glatz (2008). The (Near) Necessity of Alternate Possibilities for Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):257 - 272.
John Martin Fischer (2010). The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories. Philosophical Review 119 (3):315-336.
David Hunt & Seth Shabo (2013). Frankfurt Cases and the (in)Significance of Timing: A Defense of the Buffering Strategy. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):599-622.
Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.
Katarzyna Paprzycka (2002). Flickers of Freedom and Frankfurt-Style Cases in the Light of the New Incompatibilism of the Stit Theory. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:553-565.
John Martin Fischer (2007). The Importance of Frankfurt-Style Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):464–471.
Daniel James Speak (2007). The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):76-95.
Maria Alvarez (2009). Actions, Thought-Experiments and the 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads138 ( #17,218 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)27 ( #35,404 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?