David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Investigations 31 (4):340-358 (2008)
This paper is about the mode of being of names. The paper begins by explaining why the joke is on commentators who see Lewis Carroll's White Knight as applying the use/mention distinction. Then it argues that the real problem with the distinction is that the idea that names are used to mention what they name depends on mistakenly conceiving of language as existing autonomously; and that philosophers have this conception because they fail to appreciate what they are doing when they philosophise about language. This failure also explains why philosophers mistakenly think of any manifestation of a name as a (physical) token.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957). Report on Analysis ”Problem' No. 10. Analysis 17 (3):49--52.
Niels Egmont Christensen (1967). The Alleged Distinction Between Use and Mention. Philosophical Review 76 (3):358-367.
Alonzo Church (1956). Introduction to Mathematical Logic. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Morris Raphael Cohen (1944). An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method. [Madison, Wis.]Pub. For the United States Armed Forces Institute by Harcourt, Brace and Company.
Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Linda Wetzel, Types and Tokens. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Fabrizio Amerini (2011). Pragmatics and Semantics in Thomas Aquinas. Vivarium 49 (1-3):95-126.
Cheng-Hung Tsai (2010). Practical Knowledge of Language. Philosophia 38 (2):331-341.
Eric Thomas Weber (2008). Proper Names and Persons: Peirce's Semiotic Consideration of Proper Names. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (2):pp. 346-362.
Gideon Makin (2010). Frege's Distinction Between Sense and Reference. Philosophy Compass 5 (2):147-163.
Michael Jubien (1993). Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of Reference. Cambridge University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads24 ( #119,540 of 1,707,766 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #352,887 of 1,707,766 )
How can I increase my downloads?