Why It Is Sometimes Fair to Blame Agents for Unavoidable Actions and Omissions

American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2):93 - 104 (2005)
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Abstract

It is generally thought that ought implies can. If this maxim is correct, then my inability to do otherwise entails that I cannot be blamed for failing to do otherwise. In this article, however, I use Harry Frankfurt’s famous argument against the "Principle of Alternative Possibilities" (PAP) to show that the maxim is actually false, that I can be blamed for failing to do otherwise even in situations where I could not have done otherwise. In these situations, I do not act otherwise not because I cannot act otherwise but because I choose not to act otherwise.None

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Ken M. Levy
Louisiana State University

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