A note on the doomsday argument
Analysis 70 (1):27-30 (2010)
| Abstract | I argue that the Doomsday argument fails because it fails to take into account the lesson of the Sleeping Beauty puzzle. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesDennis Dieks (2007). Reasoning About the Future: Doom and Beauty. Synthese 156 (3):427 - 439.
Timothy Chambers (2001). Do Doomsday's Proponents Think We Were Born Yesterday? Philosophy 76 (3):443-450.
Dennis Dieks (2007). Reasoning About the Future: Doom and Beauty. Synthese 156 (3):427 - 439.
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