Are we free to break the laws?

Theoria 47 (3):113-21 (1981)
I insist that I was able to raise my hand, and I acknowledge that a law would have been broken had I done so, but I deny that I am therefore able to break a law. To uphold my instance of soft determinism, I need not claim any incredible powers. To uphold the compatibilism that I actually believe, I need not claim that such powers are even possible. My incompatibilist opponent is a creature of fiction, but he has his prototypes in real life. He is modeled partly after Peter van Inwagen and partly on myself when I first worried about van Inwagen's argument against compatibilism.
Keywords Determinism  Law  Social Philosophy  Lewis, D
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References found in this work BETA
Brian F. Chellas (1975). Basic Conditional Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):133 - 153.
Peter Van Inwagen (1977). Reply to Narveson. Philosophical Studies 32 (1):89 - 98.
Keith Lehrer (1980). Preferences, Conditionals and Freedom. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause. D. Reidel 187--201.

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