David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theoria 47 (3):113-21 (1981)
I insist that I was able to raise my hand, and I acknowledge that a law would have been broken had I done so, but I deny that I am therefore able to break a law. To uphold my instance of soft determinism, I need not claim any incredible powers. To uphold the compatibilism that I actually believe, I need not claim that such powers are even possible. My incompatibilist opponent is a creature of fiction, but he has his prototypes in real life. He is modeled partly after Peter van Inwagen and partly on myself when I first worried about van Inwagen's argument against compatibilism.
|Keywords||Determinism Law Social Philosophy Lewis, D|
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References found in this work BETA
Brian F. Chellas (1975). Basic Conditional Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):133 - 153.
Peter Van Inwagen (1974). A Formal Approach to the Problem of Free Will and Determinism. Theoria 40 (1):9-22.
Peter Van Inwagen (1977). Reply to Narveson. Philosophical Studies 32 (1):89 - 98.
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Citations of this work BETA
Neil Levy & Michael McKenna (2009). Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
Peter van Inwagen (2008). How to Think About the Problem of Free Will. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):327 - 341.
Ned Markosian (2012). Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist's Problems. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383 - 398.
Stephen Kearns (2013). Free Will Agnosticism. Noûs 47 (2):235-252.
Helen Beebee (2003). Local Miracle Compatibilism. Noûs 37 (2):258-277.
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Peter van Inwagen (1990). Logic and the Free Will Problem. Social Theory and Practice 16 (3):277-90.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2008). The Irrelevance of the Consequence Argument. Analysis 68 (297):13–22.
John Perry (2004). Compatibilist Options. In David Shier, Michael O'Rourke & Joseph Keim Campbell (eds.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT Press/Bradford Book. 231.
Thomas W. Settle (1993). How Determinism Refutes Compatibilism. Religious Studies 29 (3):353-62.
Peter van Inwagen (1975). The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Studies 27 (March):185-99.
Peter van Inwagen (1983). An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Manuel Vargas (2010). The Revisionist Turn: A Brief History of Recent Work on Free Will. In Jesus Aguilar, Andrei Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave.
Kadri Vihvelin, Arguments for Incompatibilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Helen Beebee & Alfred R. Mele (2002). Humean Compatibilism. Mind 111 (442):201-223.
S. Oakley (2006). Defending Lewis's Local Miracle Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):337-349.
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