Convention: A Philosophical Study

Harvard University Press (1969)
Abstract
_ Convention_ was immediately recognized as a major contribution to the subject and its significance has remained undiminished since its first publication in 1969. Lewis analyzes social conventions as regularities in the resolution of recurring coordination problems-situations characterized by interdependent decision processes in which common interests are at stake. Conventions are contrasted with other kinds of regularity, and conventions governing systems of communication are given special attention
Keywords Convention (Philosophy  Language and languages Philosophy
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Call number B809.15.L47
ISBN(s) 9780631232568   9780631232575
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Citations of this work BETA
David Lewis (1970). General Semantics. Synthese 22 (1-2):18--67.
Nicholas Southwood & Lina Eriksson (2011). Norms and Conventions. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):195 - 217.
Elizabeth Fricker (2006). Second-Hand Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):592–618.

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