David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 175 (3):369-382 (2010)
All parties to the Sleeping Beauty debate agree that it shows that some cherished principle of rationality has to go. Thirders think that it is Conditionalization and Reflection that must be given up or modified; halfers think that it is the Principal Principle. I offer an analysis of the Sleeping Beauty puzzle that allows us to retain all three principles. In brief, I argue that Sleeping Beauty’s credence in the uncentered proposition that the coin came up heads should be 1/2, but her credence in the centered proposition that the coin came up heads and it is Monday should be 1/3. I trace the source of the earlier mistakes to an unquestioned assumption in the debate, namely that an uncentered proposition is just a special kind of centered proposition. I argue that the falsity of this assumption is the real lesson of the Sleeping Beauty case.
|Keywords||Credence Self-location Sleeping beauty Centered proposition Uncentered proposition Conditionalization Reflection Principal principle|
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Citations of this work BETA
Patrick Hawley (2013). Inertia, Optimism and Beauty. Noûs 47 (1):85-103.
Michael G. Titelbaum (2013). Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1003-1017.
Michael G. Titelbaum (2012). An Embarrassment for Double-Halfers. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):146-151.
Daniel Peterson (2011). Qeauty and the Books: A Response to Lewis's Quantum Sleeping Beauty Problem. Synthese 181 (3):367-374.
Kai Draper (2013). The Evidential Relevance of Self-Locating Information. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):185-202.
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