Causal decision theory

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30 (1981)
Newcomb's problem and similar cases show the need to incorporate causal distinctions into the theory of rational decision; the usual noncausal decision theory, though simpler, does not always give the right answers. I give my own version of causal decision theory, compare it with versions offered by several other authors, and suggest that the versions have more in common than meets the eye.
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DOI 10.1080/00048408112340011
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Ralph Wedgwood (2012). Outright Belief. Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.
Caspar Hare (2010). Take the Sugar. Analysis 70 (2):237-247.

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