David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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There is an important sense in which an agent’s credences are universal: while they reflect an agent’s own judgments, those judgments apply equally to everyone’s bets. This point, while uncontentious, has been overlooked; people automatically assume that credences concern an agent’s own bets, perhaps just because of the name “subjective” that is typically applied to this account of belief. This oversight has had unfortunate consequences for recent epistemology, in particular concerning the Sleeping Beauty case and its myriad variants
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