David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158 (1997)
Many years ago, C.B. Martin drew our attention to the possibility of ‘finkish’ dispositions: dispositions which, if put to the test would not be manifested, but rather would disappear. Thus if x if finkishly disposed to give response r to stimulus s, it is not so that if x were subjected to stimulus r, x would give response z; so finkish dispositions afford a counter‐example to the simplest conditional analysis of dispositions. Martin went on to suggest that finkish dispositions required a theory of primitive causal powers; there, I think, he was mistaken. All that they require is an improved conditional analysis, and this improved analysis can be built upon whatever treatments of properties and of laws we may favour on other grounds
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
John Bacon, Keith Campbell & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.) (1993). Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D M Armstrong. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mark Johnston (1992). How to Speak of the Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
David K. Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
J. L. Mackie (1977). Dispositions, Grounds, and Causes. Synthese 34 (4):361 - 369.
C. B. Martin (1994). Dispositions and Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.
Citations of this work BETA
David Yates (2013). The Essence of Dispositional Essentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):93-128.
Gabriele Contessa (2013). Dispositions and Interferences. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):401-419.
Andrea Guardo (2012). Kripke's Account of the Rule-Following Considerations. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):366-388.
David Yates (2009). Emergence, Downwards Causation and the Completeness of Physics. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):110 - 131.
Markus Schrenk (2010). The Powerlessness of Necessity. Noûs 44 (4):725-739.
Similar books and articles
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). Lewis on Finkish Dispositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):703-710.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). Lewis on Finkish Dispositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):703 - 710.
Randolph Clarke (2008). Intrinsic Finks. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):512–518.
Alexander Bird (1998). Dispositions and Antidotes. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):227-234.
Toby Handfield (2008). Unfinkable Dispositions. Synthese 160 (2):297 - 308.
David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (2007). A Gradable Approach to Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):68–75.
Jesse R. Steinberg (2010). Dispositions and Subjunctives. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):323 - 341.
A. Bird & T. Handfield (2008). Dispositions, Rules and Finks. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):285-98.
Alexander Bird (2004). Antidotes All the Way Down? Theoria 19 (3):259-269.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads214 ( #3,417 of 1,679,396 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #17,992 of 1,679,396 )
How can I increase my downloads?