How Bohm's theory solves the measurement problem

Philosophy of Science 74 (5):749-760 (2007)
Abstract
I examine recent arguments based on functionalism that claim to show that Bohm's theory fails to solve the measurement problem, or if it does so, it is only because it reduces to a form of the many-worlds theory. While these arguments reveal some interesting features of Bohm's theory, I contend that they do not undermine the distinctive Bohmian solution to the measurement problem. ‡I would like to thank Harvey Brown, Martin Thomson-Jones, and David Wallace for helpful discussions. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, P.O. Box 248054, Coral Gables, FL 33124–4670; e-mail: plewis@miami.edu.
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D. Deutsch (1996). Comment on Lockwood. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (2):222-228.

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