Lucas against mechanism

Philosophy 44 (June):231-3 (1969)
J. R. Lucas argues in “Minds, Machines, and Gödel”, that his potential output of truths of arithmetic cannot be duplicated by any Turing machine, and a fortiori cannot be duplicated by any machine. Given any Turing machine that generates a sequence of truths of arithmetic, Lucas can produce as true some sentence of arithmetic that the machine will never generate. Therefore Lucas is no machine
Keywords Logic  Mechanism  Lewis, D
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819100024591
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Roger Penrose (1990). Precis of the Emperor's New Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):643-705.
Robert Wilensky (1990). Computability, Consciousness, and Algorithms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):690-691.
David J. Chalmers (1990). Computing the Thinkable. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):658-659.
Martin Davis (1990). Is Mathematical Insight Algorithmic? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):659-660.

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