Lucas against mechanism

Philosophy 44 (June):231-3 (1969)
Abstract
J. R. Lucas argues in “Minds, Machines, and Gödel”, that his potential output of truths of arithmetic cannot be duplicated by any Turing machine, and a fortiori cannot be duplicated by any machine. Given any Turing machine that generates a sequence of truths of arithmetic, Lucas can produce as true some sentence of arithmetic that the machine will never generate. Therefore Lucas is no machine
Keywords Logic  Mechanism  Lewis, D
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Citations of this work BETA
David J. Chalmers (1990). Computing the Thinkable. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):658-659.
John C. Eccles (1990). Physics of Brain-Mind Interaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):662-663.
Daniel C. Dennett (1990). Betting Your Life on an Algorithm. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):660-661.

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