Probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics

Manuscrito 33:285--306 (2010)
Abstract
The main difficulty facing no-collapse theories of quantum mechanics in the Everettian tradition concerns the role of probability within a theory in which every possible outcome of a measurement actually occurs. The problem is two-fold: First, what do probability claims mean within such a theory? Second, what ensures that the probabilities attached to measurement outcomes match those of standard quantum mechanics? Deutsch has recently proposed a decision-theoretic solution to the second problem, according to which agents are rationally required to weight the outcomes of measurements according to the standard quantum-mechanical probability measure. I show that this argument admits counterexamples, and hence fails to establish the standard probability weighting as a rational requirement.
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Citations of this work BETA
Alan Forrester (2007). Decision Theory and Information Propagation in Quantum Physics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (4):815-831.
Dennis Dieks (2007). Probability in Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):292-310.
Alastair I. M. Rae (2009). Everett and the Born Rule. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 40 (3):243-250.
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