Probability, self‐location, and quantum branching

Philosophy of Science 76 (5) (2009)
Abstract The main problem with the many‐worlds theory is that it is not clear how the notion of probability should be understood in a theory in which every possible outcome of a measurement actually occurs. In this paper, I argue for the following theses concerning the many‐worlds theory: (1) If probability can be applied at all to measurement outcomes, it must function as a measure of an agent’s self‐location uncertainty. (2) Such probabilities typically violate reflection. (3) Many‐worlds branching does not have sufficient structure to admit self‐location probabilities. (4) Decision‐theoretic arguments do not solve this problem. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, P.O. Box 248054, Coral Gables, FL 33124‐4670; e‐mail: plewis@miami.edu.
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