Radical interpretation

Synthese 27 (July-August):331-344 (1974)
What knowledge would suffice to yield an interpretation of an arbitrary utterance of a language when such knowledge is based on evidence plausibly available to a nonspeaker of that language? it is argued that it is enough to know (1) a theory of truth for the language and (2) that the theory satisfies tarski's 'convention t' (modified to apply to natural language) and (3) that it gives an optimal fit (in a sense described) to data about sentences held true, Under specified conditions, By native speakers
Keywords Belief  Desire  Epistemology  Interpretation  Meaning  Person
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DOI 10.1007/BF00484599
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References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1963). Actions, Reasons, and Causes. Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685-700.
H. P. Grice (1957). Meaning. Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
David Lewis (1970). How to Define Theoretical Terms. Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.

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Citations of this work BETA
John Haugeland (1978). The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):215-26.

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