Schlick's Critique of Positivism

Abstract
It is not well known that Moritz Schlick, whose name is inseparable from the development of logical positivism, was extremely critical of positivism prior to the 1920's. Understanding Schlick's early criticisms of positivism not only puts Schlick's transition from his early realist to his later positivist views in better perspective, but clearly shows the role of relativity theory in turning Schlick's attention to a positivist concern with empirical verification. It also can be seen that Schlick spent the second part of his philosophical career struggling to find solutions to the very problems he had criticized so vehemently in his early work.
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