Shared intentions without a self

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):707-708 (2005)
Abstract Shared knowledge of intentionality as well as shared knowledge of anything depends on the organism's understanding of itself, others, and the possible relations between self and other. This understanding involves mental representations of me, which emerges in the second half of the second year in the human infant, and it is this ability that gives rise to humanlike social understanding and complex self-conscious emotions.
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