Mind 111 (441):1-14 (2002)
|Abstract||A solution to the problem of intrinsic change for enduring things should meet three conditions. It should not replace monadic intrinsic properties by relations. It should not replace the having simpliciter of properties by standing in some relation to them (unless having them simpliciter always means standing in some relation to them, which is refuted by Bradley's regress). It should not rely on an unexplained notion of having an intrinsic property at a time. Johnston's solution satisfies the first condition at the expense of the second. Haslanger's solution satisfies the first and second at the expense of the third.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Frédéric Ferro (2002). Pour introduire à l'intrinsèque. Revue de Métaphysique Et de Morale 4:501-509.
Bradley Rettler (2012). McTaggart and Indexing the Copula. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):431-434.
Theodore Sider (1996). Intrinsic Properties. Philosophical Studies 83 (1):1 - 27.
Andrew Newman, The Bundle Theory, the Principle of Unity for Elementary Particulars, and Some Issues.
Michael Esfeld, Do Relations Require Underlying Intrinsic Properties? A Physical Argument for a Metaphysics of Relations.
Roger Harris (2010). Do Material Things Have Intrinsic Properties? Metaphysica 11 (2):105-117.
Kristie Miller & David Braddon-Mitchell (2007). There Is No Simpliciter Simpliciter. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):249 - 278.
Robyn Ferrell (2000). Copula: The Logic of the Sexual Relation. Hypatia 15 (2):100-114.
M. Oreste Fiocco (2010). Temporary Intrinsics and Relativization. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):64-77.
Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2010). The Tenseless Copula in Temporal Predication. Erkenntnis 72 (2):267 - 280.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads90 ( #9,650 of 722,813 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #20,383 of 722,813 )
How can I increase my downloads?