Utilitarianism and truthfulness

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):17 – 19 (1972)
Abstract
D. H. Hodgson has argued that among highly knowledgeable and rational act-Utilitarians there is no non-Circular reason to be truthful or to expect truthfulness from others; wherefore these utilitarians forfeit the benefits of communication. I reply that hodgson goes wrong by tacitly assuming that his utilitarians have no premises to reason from except those that hodgson lays down in specifying the example under consideration
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Colin McGinn (1980). Functionalism and Phenomenalism: A Critical Note. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (March):35-46.
Frank Jackson (1992). Critical Notice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):475 – 488.
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