Why conditionalize
In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge (2010)
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Frank Jackson, Graham Priest & David Papineau (2004). David Lewis and Schrödinger's Cat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):153 – 169.
Richard Hanley (2004). As Good as It Gets: Lewis on Truth in Fiction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):112 – 128.
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David Papineau (2004). David Lewis and Schrödinger's Cat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):153 – 169.
Hilary Greaves & David Wallace (2006). Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility. Mind 115 (459):607-632.
Olga Ramirez (2012). ‘BOGHOSSIAN's BLIND REASONING’, CONDITIONALIZATION AND THICK CONCEPTS A FUNCTIONAL MODEL. Ethics in Progress Quarterly 3 (1):31-52.
Rachael Briggs (2009). Distorted Reflection. Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85.
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