Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):225-245 (2004)
|Abstract||This paper considers the so?called explanatory gap between brain activity and conscious experience. A number of different, though closely related, explanatory gaps are distinguished and a monistic account of conscious experience, a version of Herbert Feigl's ?dual?access theory,? is advocated as a solution to the problems they are taken to pose for physicalist accounts of mind. Although dual?access theory is a version of the mind?body identity thesis, it in no way ?eliminates? conscious experience; rather, it provides a parsimonious and explanatorily fruitful theory of the consciousness?body relation which faithfully preserves the nature of conscious experience while going quite far in ?bridging? the various explanatory gaps distinguished below|
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