Selecting children: The ethics of reproductive genetic engineering

Philosophy Compass 3 (5):973-991 (2008)
Advances in reproductive genetic engineering have the potential to transform human lives. Not only do they promise to allow us to select children free of diseases, they can also enable us to select children with desirable traits. In this paper, I consider two clusters of arguments for the moral permissibility of reproductive genetic engineering, what I call the Perfectionist View and the Libertarian View; and two clusters of arguments against reproductive genetic engineering, what I call the Human Nature View and the Motivation View. I argue that an adequate theory of the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering should take into account insights gained from these views.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00174.x
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Singer (1993). Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
John Rawls (2009/2005). A Theory of Justice. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophy and Rhetoric. Oxford University Press 133-135.

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Citations of this work BETA
B. Saunders (2015). Is Procreative Beneficence Obligatory? Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (2):175-178.

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