David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2):159-179 (2010)
When philosophers consider what moral status human beings have, they tend to find themselves either supporting the idea that not all human beings are rightholders or adopting what Peter Singer calls a 'speciesist' position, where speciesism is defined as morally favoring a particular species—in this case, human beings—over others without sufficient justification. In this paper, I develop what I call the 'genetic basis for moral agency' account of rightholding, and I propose that this account can allow all human beings to be rightholders without being speciesist. While my aim is to set out this account clearly rather than to defend it, I explain how this account is different from a potentiality account and I argue that it is preferable to an actual moral agency account of human moral status
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Citations of this work BETA
Thomas V. Cunningham (2014). Nonreductive Moral Classification and the Limits of Philosophy. American Journal of Bioethics 14 (2):22-24.
Jukka Varelius (2011). Minimally Conscious State, Human Dignity, and the Significance of Species: A Reply to Kaczor. Neuroethics (Browse Results) 6 (1):85-95.
Stijn Bruers (2013). Speciesism as a Moral Heuristic. Philosophia 41 (2):489-501.
Jan Deckers (2011). Should Whiteheadians Be Vegetarians? A Critical Analysis of the Thoughts of Hartshorne and Dombrowski. Journal of Animal Ethics 1 (2):195-209.
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