David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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The Monist 89 (3):334-350 (2006)
What are you and I essentially? When do you and I come into and go out of existence? A common response is that we are essentially organisms, that is, we come into existence as organisms and go out of existence when we cease to be organisms. Jeff McMahan has put forward two arguments against the Organism View: the case of dicephalus and a special case of hemispheric commissurotomy. In this paper, I defend the Organism View against these two cases. Because it is possible to devise more McMahanian-type cases, I also provide a more general solution to these kinds of cases.
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Citations of this work BETA
Eric T. Olson (2014). The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twinning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):24-40.
Tim Campbell & Jeff McMahan (2010). Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):285-301.
Stephan Blatti (2010). Editor's Introduction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):1-2.
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