Graduate studies at Western
Studia Logica 86 (1):89 - 110 (2007)
|Abstract||A consistency default is a propositional inference rule that asserts the consistency of a formula in its consequence. Consistency defaults allow for a straightforward encoding of domains in which it is explicitely known when something is possible. The logic of consistency defaults can be seen as a variant of cumulative default logic or as a generalization of justified default logic; it is also able to simulate Reiter default logic in the seminormal case. A semantical characterization of consistency defaults in terms of processes and in terms of a fixpoint equation is given, as well as a normal form.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Gemma Robles & José M. Méndez (2009). Strong Paraconsistency and the Basic Constructive Logic for an Even Weaker Sense of Consistency. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (3):357-402.
Gianni Amati, Luigia Carlucci Aiello & Fiora Pirri (1994). Defaults as Restrictions on Classical Hilbert-Style Proofs. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (4):303-326.
John Horty (2007). Reasons as Defaults. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (3):1-28.
Gregory Wheeler (2004). A Resource-Bounded Default Logic. In J. Delgrande & T. Schaub (eds.), Proceedings of NMR 2004. AAAI.
Wiebe van der Hoek, John-Jules Meyer & Jan Treur (1998). Temporalizing Epistemic Default Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (3):341-367.
George Kafkoulis (1994). The Consistency Strength of an Infinitary Ramsey Property. Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (4):1158-1195.
José M. Méndez & Gemma Robles (2009). The Basic Constructive Logic for Absolute Consistency. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (2):199-216.
Kevin Knight (2002). Measuring Inconsistency. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):77-98.
G. Aldo Antonelli (1999). A Directly Cautious Theory of Defeasible Consequence for Default Logic Via the Notion of General Extension. Artificial Intelligence 109 (1-2):71-109.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads2 ( #246,545 of 739,347 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,538 of 739,347 )
How can I increase my downloads?