David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (2006)
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
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|Call number||BF611.C65 2006|
|ISBN(s)||9780521834285 0521834287 0521542200 9780521542203|
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Jerome R. Busemeyer, Joseph G. Johnson & Ryan K. Jessup, Preferences Constructed From Dynamic Micro-Processing Mechanisms.
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Brian Kim (2014). The Locality and Globality of Instrumental Rationality: The Normative Significance of Preference Reversals. Synthese 191 (18):4353-4376.
Dan Ariely & Michael I. Norton (2008). How Actions Create – Not Just Reveal – Preferences. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):13-16.
Shlomi Sher & Craig R. M. McKenzie (2006). Information Leakage From Logically Equivalent Frames. Cognition 101 (3):467-494.
William Hagman, David Andersson, Daniel Västfjäll & Gustav Tinghög (2015). Public Views on Policies Involving Nudges. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):439-453.
Andrea Polonioli (2015). Stanovich's Arguments Against the “Adaptive Rationality” Project: An Assessment. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 49:55-62.
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