Causation and the canberra plan

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):232-242 (2011)
David Lewis has a general recipe for analysis: the Canberra Plan. His analyses of mind, color, and value all proceed according to the plan. What is curious is that his analysis of causation – one of his seminal analyses – doesn't. It doesn't and according to Lewis it can't. Lewis has two objections against using the Canberra Plan to analyze causation. After presenting Lewis' objections I argue that they both fail. I then draw some lessons from their failure
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01395.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,879
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
David K. Lewis (1999). Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge, Uk ;Cambridge University Press.

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Daniel D. Hutto (2011). Presumptuous Naturalism: A Cautionary Tale. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):129-145.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

72 ( #43,712 of 1,725,259 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #93,181 of 1,725,259 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.