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- David Liebesman & Matti Eklund (2007). Sider on Existence. Noûs 41 (3):519–528.
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Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session.
Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session.
Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session.
Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session.
Sider has a favourable view of supersubstantivalism (the thesis that all material objects are identical to the regions of spacetime that they occupy). This paper argues that given supersubstantivalism, Sider's argument from vagueness for (mereological) universalism fails. I present Sider's vagueness argument (§§II-III), and explain why - given supersubstantivalism - some but not all regions must be concrete in order for the argument to work (§IV). Given this restriction on what regions can be concrete, I give a reductio of Sider's argument (§V). I conclude with some brief comments on why this is not simply an ad hominem against Sider, and why this incompatibility of supersubstantivalism with the argument from vagueness is of broader interest (§VI).
Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session.
There is currently debate between deflationists and anti-deflationists about the ontology of persisting objects. Some deflationists think that disputes between, for example, four-dimensionalists (e.g. Ted Sider and David Lewis) and quasi-nihilists (e.g. Peter Van Inwagen and Trenton Merricks) are merely verbal disputes. Anti-deflationists deny this. Eli Hirsch is a deflationist who maintains that many ontological disputes are merely verbal. Theodore Sider maintains that the disputes are not merely verbal. Hirsch and Sider are thus engaged in a metaontological dispute. In this paper, I argue that Hirsch's metaontological dispute with Sider is, by Hirsch's own lights, itself merely verbal. I conclude that the mere verbalness of his metaontological dispute with Sider suggests that Hirsch's account of what makes a dispute merely verbal may be problematic.
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