Is there a good epistemological argument against platonism?

Analysis 66 (290):135–141 (2006)
Abstract
Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics is the doctrine that there are mathematical objects such as numbers. John Burgess and Gideon Rosen have argued that that there is no good epistemological argument against platonism. They propose a dilemma, claiming that epistemological arguments against platonism either rely on a dubious epistemology, or resemble a dubious sceptical argument concerning perceptual knowledge. Against Burgess and Rosen, I show that an epistemological anti-platonist argument proposed by Hartry Field avoids both horns of their dilemma.
Keywords nominalism   mathematics   toread   WAYS
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    References found in this work BETA
    Paul Benacerraf (1973). Mathematical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    David Liggins (2007). Anti-Nominalism Reconsidered. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):104–111.

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