Modal fictionalism and possible-worlds discourse

Philosophical Studies 138 (2):151-60 (2008)
The Brock-Rosen problem has been one of the most thoroughly discussed objections to the modal fictionalism bruited in Gideon Rosen’s ‘Modal Fictionalism’. But there is a more fundamental problem with modal fictionalism, at least as it is normally explained: the position does not resolve the tension that motivated it. I argue that if we pay attention to a neglected aspect of modal fictionalism, we will see how to resolve this tension—and we will also find a persuasive reply to the Brock-Rosen objection. Finally, I discuss an alternative reading of Rosen, and argue that this position is also able to fend off the Brock-Rosen objection.
Keywords Modality  Fictionalism  Brock-Rosen objection  Possible world
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-006-9001-z
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive David Liggins, Modal fictionalism and possible-worlds discourse
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
David Liggins (2008). Nihilism Without Self-Contradiction. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 (62):177-196.
Frederick Kroon (2011). Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Philosophy Compass 6 (11):786-803.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

272 ( #3,229 of 1,725,308 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

30 ( #34,370 of 1,725,308 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.